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1. Doing something. 
 
Bertrand Russell refers in his book “Power” (Russell, 1938) to Bruno Mussolini’s account of 
his  experiences  during  the  Abyssinian  war,  Fascist  Italy’s  dress-rehearsal  for  the  Second 
World War. Bruno Mussolini, the son of Benito, was a fighter pilot in the Italian air force: 
 
“Our task was to set the tree-clad slopes, the fields and the small villages on 
fire  …  It  was  all  highly  diverting  …  Our  bombs  had  hardly  touched  the 
ground before they burst into white smoke and enormous flames to start the 
dry grass burning. I thought about the animals: God how they ran .. When 
our bomb-racks were empty I began to throw bombs out by hand … It was 
spiffing: a large zariba surrounded by tall trees made a difficult target. I had 
to aim carefully at the straw roof and only managed with my third shot. 
Then the poor people who were inside saw that their roof was on fire and ran 
away like madmen 
 
Surrounded by a ring of flames, about five thousand Abyssinians faced a slow 
death. It was like a veritable inferno.”  (Russell, 1938, p. 26-27) 
 
There he flies, Bruno, high above the landscape and below him savages are running round and 
round like confused ants. Like Thor, the god of thunder, he roars across the heavens. He can 
see the small insects rushing blindly around  below, he  reaches out his hand and throws a 
bomb that explodes a few seconds later in fire and destruction. It is his skill, his force, his 
power and his will that explode in close-knit union below him.  
 
“Diverting”, “spiffing”? We must not allow ourselves to be confused by the language, Italian 
translated into the idiom of 1939. It was quite simply great, brilliant. Any ten-year-old playing 
computer games could identify with this. Bruno had simply managed to get hold of all of the 
resources offered by computer games. He sees his enemies a long way off, he stretches out his 
hand and points – and annihilates them in a thunderous explosion. It is all about enjoyment 
and excitement – delight in the remote impact of extracorporeal powers. It is all about the 
feeling of doing something, of acting.  
 
And that is the theme of this essay.  
 
What exactly do business managers do? This question can be answered in different ways. We 
can enumerate the various activities that managers actually perform during their work: they 
write, they talk to other people, they take taxis to meetings, they sit in conference, they have 
lunch with representatives of other companies, they attend charity events, etc. Ever since 
Sune Carlsson’s studies of managers, we have had a pretty good idea of the patterns of activity 
of the average business manager. 
 
However, few managers would themselves describe their work in this way. Nor, we must as-
sume, do the heads of large companies pocket their millions and their options as remunera-
tion for talking to someone on the telephone or sitting in meetings with other people.  A        
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board meeting and a pensioners’ get-together are totally different events, even if what goes on 
at both can be described as “a group of people talking”. 
 
What business managers “do” cannot, in other words, be described in any meaningful way by 
determining the pattern of their activities. Something else is needed. This applies of course 
not only to business managers, it applies to everyone. From a modernist, academic perspec-
tive it may appear natural to study the activities as such. They are, in the basic positivistic 
empirical meaning, observable and measurable. Even so the activities, the movements, are not 
enough. This is pointed out, for instance, by Ragnar Rommetveit (Rommetveit, 1980) when 
he quotes “Menzel’s mystery”, i.e. Menzel’s question about what Mr Smith is really doing out 
there on the grass pushing a lawnmower in front of him. 
 
“... while it is (almost unquestionably) true that Mr. Smith is mowing his 
lawn, there are a number of other things which he is also doing by the same 
behaviour: 
he is beautifying his garden; 
he is exercising his muscles; 
he is avoiding his wife; 
he is conforming to the expectations of his neighbours; 
he is keeping up property values in Scarsdale; 
and he is angering his new neighbour, Mr. Ifabrumliz, who prefers to sleep 
late and feels that Smith's mowing is a criticism of his, Ifabrumliz's unkempt 
law” (Rommetveit, 1980, pp. 113—114) 
 
So what Mr Smith is really doing is a trifle unclear. On the other hand, what he is not in any 
meaningful way doing is only and exclusively “pushing a lawnmower backwards and forwards 
over a level area covered by grass”. This example is admittedly misleading because the activity 
seems so unambiguous that we can without the slightest hesitation reformulate it as “he’s 
mowing the lawn”. This means that we immediately ascribe to him an intention – “mowing 
the lawn”. We make what we believe to be the logical conclusion that what Mr Smith is doing 
is “mowing the lawn”. 
 
It is not however merely his intention that defines what Mr Smith is really doing, how others 
assess his activities will also play a role. Thus in the example above we can see how, perhaps 
without even thinking about it, in his activity he is doing all the other things as well – such as 
maintaining property values in Scarsdale. He may have intended to do so, or maybe not. He 
may also be disturbing his neighbour without realising it. 
 
It is this kind of problem that has prompted Clifford Geertz to develop Gilbert Ryle’s discus-
sion of what actions really mean, in which he emphasises the importance of what he calls “a 
thick description” (Geertz, 1973). Ryle imagines two boys sitting in a café winking at each 
other – “two boys rapidly contracting their eyelids”. What are they really doing? The answer is 
that they could be doing almost anything at all. A gust of wind may possibly have blown in 
some dust from the street outside and they are blinking it out of their eyes – a reflex blink. 
They may be winking conspiratorially – “did you see the girl in the kitchen!”. They may be 
practising winking – imagine being able to wink as superciliously and cleverly as Clint East-       
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wood. They may be winking “OK, let’s split”, or “I’ll hold him down while you take his wal-
let”. Indeed, the contraction of the eyelids, which can be measured empirically and  positivis-
tically, on the whole tells us nothing at all, apart from the purely physiological information 
that the boys are alive. Beyond that we have no idea of what they are up to, in the sense of 
what they are doing. A blink can mean anything at all.  
 
From this Geertz draws the practical methodological conclusion that in studying human ac-
tivities simple measurements are not enough. If we want to understand what people are really 
doing, we have to focus on the broad, thick descriptions. It is easy to concur with this idea.  
 
From the perspective adopted here, however, what is mainly interesting is that actions are not 
a matter of mere motoric activities but a complex, composite series of such activities. We are 
dealing with integral activities such as “bombing Abyssinian villages”, “annoying Mr Ifabrum-
liz”, “maintaining property values” or “increasing market shares”. What these integral activi-
ties really are cannot be determined objectively and unambiguously. Depending on the per-
spective adopted and the context assumed, a specific sequence of motoric activities may in-




The perspective that primarily defines an action, especially in Ryle’s case, is therefore the 
intention that underlies it. A blink can be many different things, depending on the intention 
of the boys. They are “doing” quite different things. And in Menzel’s mystery we have to 
imagine that Mr Smith has some kind of intention with his actions in the garden. It is also 
quite conceivable that he has a number of intentions at the same time – or maybe something 
totally different 
 
The only thing that does not seem totally probable is that Mr  Smith is walking around on his 
lawn pushing a lawnmower without any intention at all. In the case of blinking, the motoric 
activity is so simple – a contraction of the eyelids – that it could be considered to be an un-
conscious reflex. However, the complexity of mowing a lawn makes an interpretation of this 
kind totally improbable.  
 
But let us view the question from a different angle. The discussion above implies that when 
we want to determine what an action actually is, we are more interested in the intellectual 
components behind the action than in its purely physical form and effects. This may seem 
paradoxical. In some way after all, one would think, the material circumstances and processes 
should have some significance, irrespective of what those involved may “think” or be assumed 
to “think” in this respect. For some reason however, this is not how everything works. 
 
The reason for this can probably be found in the fact that human beings are social animals. 
This means that all the time we see ourselves in relation to others. In addition, people are 
thinking creatures, creatures whose perception of social relationships takes the form of “intel-
lectual understanding”. All the time we seek to explain the activities of others, all the time we 
are explaining our activities to other people. Above all human beings are garrulous animals – 
Homo  Garrulus  –  exchanging  opinions  and  thoughts  in  their  constant  small  talk  (see        
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Gustafsson, 1994). We are continually chatting to each other and – more to the point – con-
tinually chatting about each other. We evaluate each other verbally, we exchange assumptions 
about opinions and intentions. We appraise each other and gauge our appraisals through con-
versation. All the time we are guessing the intentions of others, we are trying to understand 
the activities of others. This is how order is upheld in the community and how we make it 
possible to live our lives. Without this constant understanding – or the feeling of understand-
ing – almost no aspect of what we reckon to be a reasonable life would be possible. (MacIn-
tyre, 1985, Gustafsson, 1994)  
 
When we talk about “action” we are therefore talking about “reasonable” or rationally deter-
mined activities, i.e. about activities as they can be understood from a generally reasonable, 
rational perspective. Here we have to reverse our perception of the entire issue: the extent to 
which something can be understood by others, the extent to which it is comprehensible, is 
what is reasonable, practically logical. Reason is quite simply a depiction, a summation, of 
what can be expressed by one individual to another and understood. Our shared understand-
ing constitutes general common sense. 
 
In this light it could be maintained that throughout human history there has been constant 
discourse and speculation about the issue of comprehensible and reasonable action. This is 
what Aristotle is doing (Aristotle 1980) when he expounds what he calls practical wisdom, i.e. 
the rationality with which human beings cope with the everyday activities of life. How does 
one know all that one believes one knows about what should or should not be done in the 
various situations of life? His answer, according to Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum 1990) is 
that  this  knowledge  is  something  that  comes  with  age  and  experience.  One  quite  simply 
learns in the long run how things are related to each other. 
 
The structure of practical reason is usually described by the practical syllogism in which two 
premises can by means of  a logically rational choice  mechanism create an action-logic se-
quence. This can be illustrated by a scene from practical life – borrowed from von Wright, 
1967:  a man arrives at his frozen house 
 
-  A man wants to heat his house  
-  He knows that lighting a fire will heat the house  
-  Thus: he lights a fire  
 
The reasoning is clear and easy to understand. Faced with a similar situation we would do the 
same thing. The whole sequence offers a typical example of practical common sense. At the 
same time it forms what we could regard as the principal foundation of rational thinking, the 
logic of rational action. In the management sciences we find what is in many respects the 
most highly developed theory of practical rationality. What managers do, we can then say, is 
that as rational people they want something, they know something and they then make the 
best choice. It is no more complex than that. 
 
The first premise in the syllogism consists of a “want”, which in the terminology of theoreti-
cal economics is called “the decision maker’s preference function”. The second premise refers 
to her or his “knowledge” of the potential alternative actions and their outcomes – weighted        
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in terms of reliability, risk and uncertainty. Here, it would appear, we have the kernel of eco-
nomic logic, the logic of practical rationality. The decision, the rational common sense, will 
then merely be a “technical” tautology, a trivial logical deduction from the two premises.  
 
While I was a postgraduate student one of my fellow-students, a mathematician by profes-
sion, maintained relentlessly that “all you need to be a good business manager is to know 
mathematics”. This claim made such a deep impression on me that I can still remember it 30 
years later. Admittedly he never became a business manager himself, but a university profes-
sor. Even so, I think he missed the point somewhere.  
 
Because the first premise, “want”, is not entirely without problems. It can admittedly be re-
phrased to the more scientific sounding “preference function”, but there are also other syno-
nyms that work: “intention”, “need”, “motive”, “goal”, “feeling of usefulness” or “utility” – a 
rose by any other name. In the second premise “knows” can also be replaced by “believes”, 
“guesses”, “assumes”, “imagines” or “supposes”. Above all the problem for many people is not 
always concentrating on wanting and knowing but on knowing what to want – and also not 
always wanting to know. 
 
The mistake my mathematical colleague made, I believe, was to confuse the map with the 
terrain. He imagined that human actions take the same form as talk about human actions. 
Our tendency to describe and analyse actions in the stringent terms of intellectualised ration-
ality  does  not,  however,  necessarily  mean  that  action,  the  actual  contextually  determined 
deeds of active individuals, always follows the same elegant trajectory as our intellectual analy-
sis. 
 
Human decision making and action has been described since Descartes (and therefore since 
the earlier progenitor of his ideas, Plato) as an exclusively intellectual activity. This concep-
tion seems to enjoin us to disregard any underlying needs and drives that may prompt the 
actions of every individual. These are transformed in rational people into intellectual parame-
ters, to “preferences” and “benefit functions”, which can then be dealt with as required by the 
mechanistic logic of the practical syllogism. Or, if they have not yet been measured and ren-
dered manageable, that is what we should focus on doing. 
 
An entire sector, indeed nearly an era, in business studies thinking has faithfully followed this 
classically modernistic lead. Management has been seen persistently as an exclusively intellec-
tual activity. Sometimes this has even been taken so far that individual actors have been neu-
tralised to become no more than countervailing functions in the rational operations of deci-
sion making systems. It is from this perspective that we can understand the attention aroused 
by the contribution made by Herbert Simon (Simon, 1958, March and Simon, 1958) to busi-
ness studies debate in pointing out the obviousness of the “bounded rationality” of the eco-
nomic decision makers and that we should therefore structure our theoretical perception of 
the human actors on this basis. People had managed to persuade themselves, perhaps merely 
through an intellectual oversight, of the possibility of the existence of a totally rational human 
being. 
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Even the problem of knowing what one wants is converted in this approach to an intellectual 
enquiry. By relating the specific situation to a more globally applicable general preference 
function – “what do you want to do with your life – maximise it, of course” – it is assumed 
that an objectively rational desire can be deduced. “In other words: in this context this is 
what you should want!” 
 
3. Body and feelings. 
 
However, my interest here is not the limitations of rationality but its extensions. Common-
sensical rational thinking, as it is mainly dealt with in economic theory, is not enough to de-
scribe economic activities. Management is not exclusively a question of intellectual opera-
tions. It does not matter how well you think – if you take no action, nothing will come of it. 
At the core of conceptions about reason and rationality lie actions that are based in reality 
and which can change it. 
 
Some years ago Antonio Damasio (Damasio 1994) aroused some attention with his book Des-
carte´s Error in which he used physiological studies of the brain to support his claim that 
purely intellectual rationality does not and cannot exist. It is always linked to the physiology 
of the living body’s emotional system.  
 
Damasio uses the dramatic example of Phineas Gage, an American railwayman. In 1848, when 
he was 25, an accidental explosion blew an inch-thick iron bar through his skull. The bar en-
tered at an angle from below and the explosion was so powerful that it then flew a further 30 
metres or so. Even though the accident destroyed parts of his brain – a picture of the skull 
with a large hole in it is included – Gage survived. He did not even lose consciousness. Even-
tually he recovered to live for many years. Afterwards he was also able to speak, reason, dis-
cuss and express himself rationally in every other way. However he was transformed from 
what had once been a well-adjusted individual to a social catastrophe. His most significant 
handicap was that despite his ability to reason he lacked any capacity for rational action. He 
could not make decisions, his actions were erratic, inconsistent and irrational in every way. 
He lacked the capacity to plan and control his life. 
 
What had happened, Damasio claims, and he cites not only the dramatic fate of Gage but 
more modern cases of brain injury as well, was that the injury had eliminated the section of 
Gage’s brain in which “feelings” are dealt with. Without this emotional centre Gage lacked 
the ability to “feel” anything. In being unable to feel he lost the capacity to act rationally, 
even though he continued to be able to talk rationally about rational actions. You could say 
that Phineas P. Gage had been transformed into “economic man”, that he had become eco-
nomic theory. 
 
The general thesis that Damasio deduces from all this is that nothing that resembles autono-
mous human reason can exist independently of the body in which it lives. Quite the opposite, 
he asserts, thoughts and emotions constitute an indissoluble entity of mutual recursiveness. 
As its title, Descarte’s Error suggests, the book is a contribution to the never-ending debate 
on “body versus soul”, on “feeling versus thought”. In his opinion Descarte’s error is 
        
The Pink Machine Papers #25 N
o 4/2005  Claes Gustafsson: ZAP  
 
  7 
“the abysmal separation of body and mind, between the sizeable, dimensioned, 
mechanically operated, infinitely divisible body stuff, on the one hand, and 
the unsizeable, undimensioned, un-pushpullable, nondivisible mind stuff; the 
suggestion that reasoning, and moral judgement, and the suffering that comes 
from physical pain or emotional upheaval might exist separately from the 
body.” (Damasio, 1994, p. 249-250) 
 
The question is not therefore one of a dichotomy between thought and feeling but a unity 
thought/feeling: 
 
“...there may be a connecting trail, in anatomical and functional terms, from 
reason to feelings to body. It is as if we are possessed by a passion for reason, a 
drive that originates in the brain core, permeates other levels of the nervous 
system, and emerges as feelings or nonconscious biases that guide decision mak-
ing. Reason, from the practical to the theoretical, is probably constructed on 
this inherent drive by a process which resembles the mastering of a skill or 
craft.” (Damasio, 1994, p. 245) 
 
Actually, this is not so surprising after all. As Mark Johnson and George Lakoff (Johnson, 
1987, Lakoff, 1987, Lakoff and Johnson, 1980. See also Gustafsson, 1980) demonstrate, lan-
guage, indeed words in themselves, in terms of their meaning and comprehension are inti-
mately linked to the body and to feelings related to the body. And this is also true of the way 
we use language, we understand with our bodies. 
 
From a certain perspective we should however be able to view pure reason as independent of 
the individual, as a cultural product. Your ability to read is not the result of genetic program-
ming, which would mean that the ability to read developed at a certain age. On the contrary, 
reading has to be practised for a long time and conscientiously, often reluctantly and through 
compulsion. After many years of such endeavour, moreover, you have merely learnt to read 
one or a few of the world’s languages. This is how you inherit your language and your reading 
ability, you receive it from the surroundings you happen to find yourself in. Nor do you learn 
to count spontaneously. What happens instead has been described by Ludwig Wittgenstein 
(Wittgenstein, 1967, p.4 ) like this: 
 
“Counting ( .. ) is a technique that is employed daily in the most various op-
erations of our lives. And that is why we learn to count as we do: with end-
less practice, with merciless exactitude; that is why it is inexorably insisted 
that we shall all say 'two' after 'one', 'three' after 'two' and so on. . . . it can't 
be said of the series of natural numbers — any more than of our language — 
that it is true, but: that it is usable, and, above all, it is used.” 
 
The same obviously applies to virtually everything included in what we normally refer to as 
“rational common sense”, developed into methods, algorithms, norms and ideas, and learnt 
through intensive schooling and practice. Here we are dealing with conceptual models cre-
ated by others, often step-by-step from one generation to the next. Certain clear-cut contri-
butions can be discerned – Plato, Aristotle, Newton, Wittgenstein, or Smith, Marx, Keynes,        
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Friedman and, why not, Fredrick Winslow Taylor and Bill Gates – but they too merely devel-
oped ideas they had received from others. An individual’s innate capacity for reason most of-
ten allows no more than learning by trial and error, which seldom generates abstract knowl-
edge and even more rarely results in the development of conceptual models. What we have is 
a culturally determined, extremely sophisticated and fine-honed way of reasoning that has 
been produced by thousands of generations one after the other and which is not inherent in 
our brains but in the culture in which this little brain has been born. How this works has been 
described in an elegant metaphor by Kenneth Burke (Burke, 1957, p. 94) in answering his own 
question about where all narratives come from: 
 
“From the ‘unending conversation’ that is going on in history when we are 
born. Imagine you enter a parlor. You come late. When you arrive, others 
have long preceded you, and  they are engaged in a heated discussion, a discus-
sion too heated for them to pause and tell you exactly what it is about. In fact, 
the discussion had already begun long before any of them got there, so that no 
one present is qualified to retrace for you all the steps that had gone before. 
You listen for awhile, until you decide that you have caught the tenor of the 
argument; then you put in your oar. Someone answers; you answer him; an-
other comes to your defense; another aligns himself against you, to either the 
embarrassment or gratifica¬tion of your opponent, depending upon the qual-
ity of  your ally's assistance. However, the discussion is interminable.  The 
hour grows late, you must depart. And you do depart, when the discussion is 
still vigorously in progress.”  
  
In some way this immaterial and abstract “mass of rationality” encounters the material in the 
human brain. It not only encounters the brain, it acquires its meaning, its life there. The 
models of rational thought are linked through the emotional system to the body – “from rea-
son to feelings to body”. Rational common sense admittedly exists, but in itself it lacks life 
and meaning. Linked to the body through feelings, it acquires meaning and leads to under-
standing and action. Damasio, however, only half answers the question of how this occurs.  
 
Every researcher has enjoyed an “aha-experience”, the feeling of pleasure that comes from 
sudden intellectual insight, after all that is why we continue our research. It would appear to 
be self-evident that it also has a physiological, emotional element – restlessness, rapid breath-
ing, a heady feeling of pleasure and joy. It  may well be that the mental activity linked to intel-
lectual insights releases endorphins. Rational thought may be a mild addiction to endorphins 
– “a passion for reasoning”. Rationality only comes to life in the body. 
 
4. The extended arm. 
 
However,  not  even  the  body  is  a  totally  unambiguous  and  unproblematical  material  phe-
nomenon – i.e. only and unequivocally consisting of and limited to flesh and blood. It exists 
to the same extent as an immaterial image of itself in the senses. And at the emotional and 
intellectual level this image is at least as important as its material existence. In his book “The 
Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat” the neurophysiologist Oliver Sacks describes the 
different kinds of “phantom experiences” felt by his patients. This expression denotes the        
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phenomena linked to an individual’s internal feeling of the existence and workings of her or 
his own body. It often happens that people who have lost a limb, a leg for instance, will con-
tinue to feel for a long time afterwards that it is still there. Not only do they feel that the leg 
is still there, they even feel pain, heat and cold, in the non-existent leg. Sacks quotes one pa-
tient whose leg had been amputated: 
 
 “There’s this thing, this ghost-foot, sometimes it hurts like hell and the toes 
curl up, or go into spasm. This is worst at night, or with the prosthesis off, or 
when I’m not doing anything. It goes away when I strap the prosthesis on and 
walk. I still feel the leg then, vividly, but it’s a good phantom, different – it 
animates the prosthesis, and allows me to walk.” (Sacks, 1986, p. 66) 
 
This “phantom” is, Sacks notes, not merely negative. On the contrary it is vital if the patient 
is to be able to use the prosthesis. Without the phantom experience he has no feeling that 
the prosthesis is his leg. Without that feeling he cannot use it to walk. Sacks describes the 
case of one patient who has to strike the stump of his amputated leg repeatedly every morn-
ing to “wake” the non-existent leg so that he can walk using his prosthesis. 
 
The capacity for phantom experiences is obviously, however, not only restricted to limbs that 
have been lost. Human beings have the ability to create phantom experiences outside their 
own bodies. An excavator driver, for instance, eventually learns how to handle the two or 
three ton excavator jib as if it were an extension of his own body, his arms and hands: he 
stretches out his arm, gropes around, lifts, balances and moves enormous rocks with it. It is 
sometimes claimed that excavator drivers show off their skills by using the shovel to roll and 
lift fresh eggs without damaging the shell. They also use the jib as a kind of extra foot for 
support when they have to move the excavator in confined spaces. A skilful driver can climb 
rocks in his excavator. He does not feel that he is “driving” a large machine but more as if he 
was “stretching out his arm” to “dig”.  
 
Every experienced motorist has had the same feeling. Only when your body and your car have 
fused into a spontaneous, automatic unit can you feel that you are really “driving”. The joy of 
driving also rests in the feeling that the car is an extension of the body and of its powers – a 
feeling of spatial motoric capacity. As Erik Ryding (Ryding, 1979) points out, our I includes 
our cars: off I go, I accelerate, I skid, I collide, I got a dent. 
 
Another analogous form of extracorporeal phantom extension can be found in different kinds 
of shooting. An experienced marksman does  not take  aim. He  raises his rifle which  then 
forms a unit with his body, and squeezes the trigger. This is why the shape of the stock is so 
important – “the barrel fires but the stock takes aim”. The stock has to sit correctly, fit prop-
erly against the shoulder. The marksman is unable and has no time to check this, he merely 
points his extended arm at the target. The trajectory of the hail of lead is for him an exten-
sion of his vision and feeling – he kills with a look. Like Thor, the god of thunder, he casts a 
thunderbolt at the bird in flight; he reaches out and “plucks it from the sky”. 
 
This is where we meet Bruno Mussolini. Aiming a dart is just as much of a ballistic whole as 
shooting. Hitting panic-stricken fleeing Abyssinians with bombs is too. Somewhere Ronald        
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Reagan, the former president of the USA, is described as expressing his great delight that all 
small American boys were playing computer games. A good way of learning to shoot is quite 
simply to point your finger and say “bang”. All the manuals on shooting also recommend daily 
“sighting exercises” – like practising swimming on dry land. Look at the quarry, close your 
eyes and raise your gun. Then you open your eyes to see how well your body managed to aim.  
This is how to train and limber up the ballistic motor skills of the phantom body. Reagan 
imagined that by spending all their spare time in front of a computer screen and fixing their 
sights on enemy targets, an entire generation of young American boys were already acquiring 
a feeling for modern air warfare. You stretch out your electronic-ballistic-motoric arm: “ZAP 
– down goes a Mig”.  
 
One of the characteristics of the human brain is obviously an advanced, sophisticated and 
broad ability for extracorporeal sensations, phantom feelings. Our motoric, spatial and social 
reality is shaped to a great extent by these phantom feelings. At the same time we must not 
delude ourselves into believing that these experiences are, as it were, automatically inscribed 
in our genes, that they are genuinely organic. On the contrary, all the examples cited above 
show that we are dealing with entities of feeling that have developed as a result of prolonged 
training and experience – as “a skill or a craft”. (And it is worth noting that this also applies to 
animals. The ability of a cat to capture a mouse in one lightning and precisely targeted leap is 
the outcome of thousands of clumsy and unsuccessful attempts as a kitten). 
 
The idea I am attempting to suggest, quite hypothetically, is that human “emotional intellect” 
has a capacity, indeed a tendency, to relate to immaterial and abstract phenomena through 
the medium of extracorporeal “phantom feelings”. Actually  it  is wrong  to  refer  to this  as 
phantom feeling, after all it is more a question of the structure of the normal experience of 
reality. Existential and action-related experiences are extracorporeal by nature.  
 
5. Out through the window. 
 
Descarte’s error was to see the body and the soul as discrete entities, separate from each 
other. We should rather consider that reason functions as a combination of an immaterial 
rationality, on the one hand,  that is autonomous from the individual and, on the other, the 
system of emotions that gives it life.  
 
“Rationality” in its strict meaning is not to any great extent a matter of individual characteris-
tics. It can rather be seen as a basic structure in a cultural system. Individuals “imbibe” – imi-
tate, assimilate, learn – the reason that exists in the culture. They combine this with their 
emotional systems, otherwise they would not be able to accept it. In this combination ab-
stract reason acquires life and meaning. 
 
I would also claim that there is another mistake inherent in the Cartesian picture. It creates 
the impression that individuals are restricted to the physiological boundaries of their own 
bodies. Earlier scientific and medical works dealing with human beings, body and soul, often 
contained elaborate  illustrations portraying a  tiny homunculus,  the soul, sitting  inside  the 
head and directing everything. Often the concept was depicted even more graphically by lines        
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that show how the external environment is focused by the lens of the eye to form a reflection 
in the inner camera obscura that is then observed and analysed by the homunculus inside. 
 
What we are really being shown by this image is the conception of mankind sketched by the 
Cartesian model of reason, a rational soul incarcerated behind a window through which it 
observes existence. This can only be reached if the soul directs the physical implements – 
arms, legs, etc. The Cartesian rational soul therefore lacks not only feelings and life, it is also 
isolated and alienated. It is cut off from the reality around it and has to rest content with 
mere observation through its closed window. 
 
And here, I would like to maintain, lies the other Cartesian error. In reality, the window is 
open and the body-soul is reaching out through it. From birth onwards, life consists largely of 
learning. In this way we acquire not only culture and reason, but we also learn how to make 
contact with our environment. Assiduous training enables the phantom limbs of thought and 
feeling to reach out to the world around us, to experience different things, trees and bushes, 
mountains and lakes, distance and nearness, threat and refuge. They also learn all the social 
relationships, they embrace culture with phantom sinews and phantom muscles in the form of 
power and ethics, responsibility, desire, understanding, empathy, fear, anger, steadfastness, 
etc. They learn to perceive links and functions, they develop the capacity to predict sponta-
neously, “ballistically”, not only the trajectory of a ball in flight but also the activities and pat-
terns of activity of other people. They  “sense” market trends and fluctuations in the stock 
exchange. They feel the economic dynamics in the fields in which they operate. 
 
In this way power and management means that the imaginary phantom bodies extend into 
the environment, incorporate other people. They encompass them, include them as part of 
themselves. If we start to muse about metaphors, for instance, we may wonder how Charle-
magne, “Charles the Great”, acquired his name. If the appellation had nothing to do with his 
physical build – and the same epithet has been applied to many great commanders, as well as 
painters and philosophers irrespective of their height or weight – one can wonder what justi-
fied describing him as “great”. In what way is a “great man” great? My inference is that the 
meaning of the expression lies partly in the understanding of the extracorporeal or physical 
extension of the phantom body that can be found in exercising power over others. 
 
In this way, therefore, economic activities will never be devoid of feeling, the neutral rational 
operations that theory would like to envisage. Managing companies, doing business, always 
involves powerful extracorporeal emotional content. The business executive stands like Darth 
Vader in Star Wars – He stretches out his hand and the glowing crystal he holds, he aims at 
his target – ZAP!        
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von Wright, Georg Henrik (1967). Norm and Action, Oxford: Routledge and Kegan Paul Pink Machine is the name of a research project currently carried out at the Department of Industrial
Economics and Management at the Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm. It aims to study the
often forgotten non-serious driving forces of technical and economical development. We live indeed
in the reality of the artificial, one in which technology has created, constructed and reshaped almost
everything that surrounds us. If we look around us in the modern world, we see that it consists of
things,  of artefacts.  Even  the  immaterial  is  formed  and  created  by  technology -  driven  by  the
imperative of the economic rationale.
As Lev Vygotsky and Susanne Langer have pointed out, all things around us, all these technological
wonders, have their first origin in someone’s  fantasies, dreams,  hallucinations and  visions. These
things, which through their demand govern local and global economical processes, have little to do
with what we usually regard as “basic human needs”. It is rather so, it could be argued, that the
economy  at large is governed by human’s unbounded thirst for jewellery, toys and entertainment. For
some reason - the inherent urge of science for being taken seriously, maybe - these aspects have been
recognised only in a very limited way within technological and economical research.
The seriousness of science is grey, Goethe said, whereas the colour of life glows green. We want to
bring forward yet another colour, that of frivolity, and it is pink.
The Pink Machine Papers is our attempt to widen the perspective a bit, to give science a streak of
pink. We would like to create a forum for half-finished scientific reports, of philosophical guesses and
drafts. We want thus to conduct a dialogue which is based on current research and which gives us the
opportunity to present our scientific ideas before we develop them into concluding and rigid - grey -
reports and theses.
Finally: the name “Pink Machine” comes from an interview carried out in connection with heavy
industrial constructions, where the buyer of a diesel power plant worth several hundred million dollars
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